Trust TR1, a charitable remainder trust, holds a ten percent partnership interest in Partnership PRS. Because PRS holds a residual interest in a REMIC, section 860C(a) requires PRS to take into account its daily portion of the REMIC’s net income or net loss. For 2004, a portion of the REMIC net income taken into account by PRS was an excess inclusion, as defined in section 860E(c).

Trust TR2, a charitable remainder trust, holds a ten percent equity interest in Corporation R, which has elected, and is qualified, to be treated as a REIT under subchapter M of the Code. Because R holds a residual interest in a REMIC, section 860C(a) requires R to take into account its daily portion of the REMIC’s net income or net loss. For 2004, a portion of the REMIC net income taken into account by R was an excess inclusion, as defined in section 860E(c). R’s real estate investment trust taxable income (within the meaning of section 857(b)(2), excluding any net capital gain) was zero.

As a partner of PRS, TR1 has a distributive share of the excess inclusion income of PRS, as determined under section 702(a) and (b). If section 860E(b) characterizes the excess inclusion income allocated to TR1 as UBTI, TR1 will lose its exemption under section 664(c) for 2004. Section 860E(b) treats excess inclusion income as UBTI to the holder of a REMIC residual interest but only if the holder “is an organization subject to the tax imposed by section 511” (that is, subject to the UBIT). In the case of a charitable remainder trust, section 664(c) employs the definitional rules of section 512 and the other UBIT provisions to determine whether any of the trust’s income is UBTI, but it does not subject the trust to section 511. (See the discussion below under Issue 2.)

Whether section 860E(b) characterizes the excess inclusion income of charitable remainder trusts as UBTI should be determined in light of the intent underlying section 860E and other REMIC provisions. A number of the REMIC provisions are comprehensive and complementary by design. If a tax-exempt entity holds the REMIC residual interest, the REMIC provisions ensure the taxation of excess inclusion income in all events, whether or not the tax-exempt holder of the REMIC residual interest is a disqualified organization. A disqualified organization (as defined in section 860E(e)(5)(B)) is a tax-exempt entity that is not subject to UBIT. Thus, a disqualified organization cannot be subject to a tax on any excess inclusion income allocable to it. But other tax exempt entities are generally subject to UBIT and could be subject to a tax on excess inclusion income, subject to other requirements.

With respect to disqualified organizations, a REMIC is required to have in place “reasonable arrangements designed to ensure that . . . residual interests in [the REMIC] are not [transferred to] disqualified organizations . . . .” Section 860D(a)(6). If an entity nonetheless transfers a REMIC residual interest to a disqualified organization, section 860E(e)(1) imposes a tax on the transferor. Further, if a pass-thru entity has a record equity owner that is a disqualified organization, the pass-thru entity must pay a tax on the amount of excess inclusion income that is allocable to the disqualified organization. Section 860E(e)(6)(A). With respect to other tax-exempt entities (which are not disqualified organizations), section 860E(b) generally provides that, if a tax-exempt entity that is subject to the UBIT holds a REMIC residual interest, the excess inclusion income of that holder is UBTI.

Sections 860E(e)(6)(A) and 860E(b) are complementary provisions that should be interpreted consistently. If a pass-thru entity (whose equity owners may be disqualified organizations or other tax-exempt entities) holds REMIC residual interests, the two sections ensure that the excess inclusion income is taxable either to the pass-thru entity (under section 860E(e)(6)(A)) or to its tax-exempt equity owner that is subject to UBIT (under section 860E(b)). Characterizing as UBTI only the excess inclusion income that is allocable to tax exempt entities that are actually subject to the UBIT causes the two sections to operate consistently.

As discussed below, a charitable remainder trust can never be subject to the UBIT. Accordingly, TR1’s distributive share of PRS’s excess inclusion income is not UBTI under section 860E(b).

TR1 and TR2 are charitable remainder trusts. Under section 664(c), a charitable remainder trust is exempt from tax under subtitle A of the Code, including chapter 1, unless it has UBTI for the taxable year (determined as if UBIT applied to the charitable remainder trust). But if a charitable remainder trust has UBTI, it loses its section 664(c) tax exemption for the taxable year, and the resulting tax liability is determined under the trust tax provisions of the Code. See § 1.664-1(c). Thus, if a charitable remainder trust has UBTI, that trust becomes an organization subject to the tax imposed by sections 1 and 641 but not to the UBIT. Because a charitable remainder trust can never be subject to the UBIT, it is a disqualified organization, as defined in section 860E(e)(5). As charitable remainder trusts, TR1 and TR2 are disqualified organizations.

PRS and R are pass-thru entities, as defined in section 860E(e)(6)(B). For purposes of section 860E(e)(6)(A), PRS is treated as having allocated excess inclusion income to TR1, a disqualified organization, equal to its distributive share of the excess inclusion income of PRS determined under section 702. Because R’s real estate investment trust income is zero, all of R’s excess inclusion income is allocable to its shareholders. R’s excess inclusion income is allocable to TR2, also a disqualified organization, in proportion to the dividends paid to TR2 (determined without regard to any special allocation to TR2 of the expense for the tax under section 860E(e)(6)). See § 1.860E-2(b)(4) (providing an exception to the preference dividend rule in section 562(c)).

PRS and R have record equity owners that are disqualified organizations, to which excess inclusion income is allocable. Thus, PRS and R are subject to a tax under section 860E(e)(6)(A) on the amount of the excess inclusion income allocable to TR1 and TR2, respectively, at the highest rate specified in section 11(b)(1).

This document contains amendments to the Regulations on Procedure and Administration (26 CFR part 301) relating to the provision of notice under section 6320 of the Internal Revenue Code to taxpayers of a right to a CDP hearing (CDP Notice) after the IRS files a NFTL. Final regulations (T.D. 8979, 2002-1 C.B. 466) were published on January 18, 2002, in the Federal Register (67 FR 2558) (the 2002 final regulations). The 2002 final regulations implemented certain changes made by section 3401 of the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (Public Law 105-206, 112 Stat. 685) (RRA 1998), including the addition of section 6320 to the Internal Revenue Code.

Section 3401 of RRA 1998 also added section 6330 to the Internal Revenue Code. That statute provides for notice to taxpayers of a right to a hearing before or, in limited cases, after levy. A number of the provisions in section 6330 concerning the conduct and judicial review of a CDP hearing are incorporated by reference in section 6320. On January 18, 2002, final regulations (T.D. 8980, 2002-1 C.B. 477) under section 6330 were published in the Federal Register (67 FR 2549) along with the 2002 final regulations under section 6320.

On September 16, 2005, the IRS and the Treasury Department published in the Federal Register (70 FR 54681) a notice of proposed rulemaking and notice of public hearing (REG-150088-02, 2005-43 I.R.B. 774). The IRS received one set of written comments responding to the notice of proposed rulemaking. Because no one requested to speak at the public hearing, the hearing was cancelled. After considering each of the comments, the proposed regulations are adopted as amended by this Treasury decision.

On August 17, 2006, the Pension Protection Act of 2006, Public Law 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (the PPA), was enacted. Section 855 of the PPA amended section 6330(d) of the Internal Revenue Code to withdraw judicial review of CDP notices of determination from United States district court jurisdiction, leaving review solely in the United States Tax Court. Section 6330(d) is made applicable to section 6320 hearings by section 6320(c). The amendment to section 6330(d), effective for notices of determination issued on or after October 17, 2006, requires the removal of references to district court review in the 2002 final regulations. This Treasury decision removes those references.

The IRS and the Treasury Department have determined that a notice of proposed rulemaking and solicitation of public comments are not required to amend the regulations to implement the modification to section 6330(d). These amendments are made solely to conform the regulations to a statutory change enacted by Congress. Because the amendments do not involve any exercise of discretion or interpretation, the notice and public comment procedures are unnecessary.

The comments and changes to the proposed regulations, and the amendments required by the Congressional modification to section 6330(d), are discussed below.

The comments suggested that the IRS be required to contact taxpayers who timely file an incomplete request for CDP hearing to give them the opportunity to perfect the request within a reasonable time period and further recommended that such contact be in writing and identify the infirmity requiring perfection. The comments also recommended that the final regulations establish a specific time period during which taxpayers may, by right, amend or perfect their previously-filed yet incomplete CDP hearing request. The request, according to the comments, should be considered timely if it is perfected within the applicable time period.

Currently, the practice of the IRS is to contact taxpayers whose hearing requests fail to satisfy the requirements specified by the existing regulations and ask these taxpayers to perfect their requests within a specified period of time. The IRS considers requests perfected within the time specified to be timely. The intention of the IRS and the Treasury Department is to incorporate this administrative procedure into the proposed regulations. The final regulations more clearly state that the IRS will make a reasonable attempt to contact taxpayers to give them a reasonable period of time to perfect incomplete requests. However, the timeframe in which to respond to the request, and the method of delivery of the request (i.e., orally or in writing) are more appropriately addressed in the Internal Revenue Manual. The final regulations make clear that requests perfected within the time period specified by the IRS will be considered timely.

The final regulations do not adopt the suggestion to establish a period of time during which a taxpayer is allowed to perfect an incomplete request, without regard to a perfection request from the IRS. The IRS and Treasury Department believe that the procedure incorporated into the final regulations is sufficient to permit taxpayers to ensure their requests are complete.

The comments recommended that the IRS Office of Appeals (Appeals) be given the discretion to permit a taxpayer to amend an imperfect hearing request after the period for perfecting the request has expired, if the taxpayer can demonstrate that such amendment furthers an alternative to collection. This change to the regulations is unnecessary because Appeals is already empowered to exercise this discretion. Neither the current regulations nor the proposed amendments limits Appeals from exercising this discretion. Accordingly, the final regulations do not adopt this recommendation. Further clarification, however, will be provided in the Internal Revenue Manual.

The comments suggested that where a taxpayer fails to perfect a CDP hearing request until after the time period specified by the IRS, the perfected request should be automatically treated as a request for an equivalent hearing. Treating untimely perfected requests as equivalent hearing requests may unduly prolong the process in cases in which a taxpayer does not want an equivalent hearing. Accordingly, the final regulations do not adopt this suggestion. The final regulations, however, provide that Appeals will determine the timeliness of CDP hearing requests. The final regulations also add to the proposed regulations that taxpayers making an untimely request will be provided the opportunity to have the request for CDP hearing treated as a request for equivalent hearing, without submitting an additional request.

The comments requested that the final regulations give taxpayers whose hearing requests might be construed as making a frivolous argument the right to amend their hearing requests to raise relevant, non-frivolous issues. The comments further recommended that all taxpayers be given the right to supplement the hearing request prior to the conference conducted by Appeals.

These comments indicate concern that taxpayers may be unable to articulate reasons for disagreeing with the collection action that are satisfactory to Appeals. The reasons for disagreeing with the collection action need not be detailed. To assist taxpayers in articulating reasons, the IRS is revising Form 12153, “Request for a Collection Due Process Hearing,” to add examples of the most common reasons taxpayers give for requesting a hearing, including requests for collection alternatives. In any event, the informal nature of the CDP hearing permits taxpayers and Appeals to discuss collection alternatives and issues not listed in the hearing request if such discussion will help resolve the case. Accordingly, the final regulations do not adopt these recommendations.

The comments urged that the final regulations guarantee a face-to-face conference for each taxpayer who presents a relevant, non-frivolous reason for disagreement with the collection action. If this recommendation is not adopted, the comments suggest that the regulations address and provide examples of when a face-to-face conference will not be granted. The final regulations do not adopt the recommendation to guarantee a face-to-face conference for each taxpayer raising a relevant, non-frivolous issue. The IRS and the Treasury Department agree with the comments that a face-to-face conference can be a useful forum for resolving a taxpayer’s issues. The final regulations recognize the importance of a face-to-face meeting by providing that taxpayers will ordinarily be offered an opportunity for a face-to-face conference. There will be instances, however, when a face-to-face conference is not practical. The final regulations identify typical situations in which a face-to-face conference will be neither necessary nor productive. Except for these situations, the IRS and the Treasury Department anticipate that Appeals will afford a face-to-face meeting to taxpayers who request one. Nonetheless, unanticipated circumstances may arise in which granting a face-to-face conference will not be appropriate. The final regulations give Appeals the flexibility needed to respond to unanticipated circumstances.

Adoption of the comment requesting guidance on when a face-to-face conference will not be granted is unnecessary. The final regulations retain descriptions of situations in which a face-to-face conference will not be granted, as illustrated in the proposed regulations. Further guidance on granting face-to-face conferences will be provided in the Internal Revenue Manual.

The comments suggested that a taxpayer who appears to be presenting only frivolous reasons be given an opportunity to provide relevant, non-frivolous reasons in order to obtain a face-to-face conference. Adoption of this recommendation is unnecessary. Correspondence sent by Appeals to taxpayers who make only frivolous arguments invites them to submit relevant, non-frivolous reasons. Appeals offers face-to-face conferences to taxpayers who respond by providing such reasons.

The comments also suggested that the regulations define relevant and frivolous. The IRS and the Treasury Department believe that any attempt to define these terms is unnecessary and could result in underinclusive definitions. For example, the comments suggest that a frivolous issue be defined as an issue that is the same or substantially similar to an issue identified as frivolous by the IRS in published guidance. It is not possible to anticipate or keep pace with the evolution of frivolous arguments through published guidance. Instead, taxpayers are advised to consult the lists of examples of frivolous arguments in IRS Publication 2105, “Why Do I Have to Pay Taxes” and on the IRS website in a document entitled “The Truth about Frivolous Tax Arguments.” The names and web addresses of these documents, and a toll-free number to order Publication 2105, will be added to the instructions to Form 12153 to help taxpayers avoid making these arguments.

The comments recommended clarification of the proposed rule that a face-to-face conference concerning a collection alternative will not be granted unless the alternative would be available to other taxpayers in similar circumstances. According to the comments, a taxpayer should not be denied a face-to-face conference because the requested collection alternative cannot be accepted, for example, because it appears from financial information that the taxpayer can pay the liabilities in full. This proposed rule was not intended to deny a face-to-face conference because the requested collection alternative would not be accepted. The intention of this rule is to permit the denial of a face-to-face conference to discuss a collection alternative for which the taxpayer is not eligible. A lack of eligibility under IRS policy is tied to a taxpayer’s compliance with the Federal tax laws, not to the taxpayer’s financial circumstances or ability to request the most appropriate alternative. For example, if the taxpayer has not filed all required tax returns, the taxpayer is not eligible for an offer to compromise or an installment agreement.

In response to the concerns expressed in the comments, the final regulations amplify the rule that a face-to-face conference to discuss a collection alternative will not be granted unless other taxpayers would be eligible for the alternative in similar circumstances. The final regulations provide in A-D8 that Appeals in its discretion may grant a face-to-face conference if Appeals determines that a face-to-face conference is appropriate to explain to the taxpayer the requirements for becoming eligible for a collection alternative. The final regulations also provide that taxpayers will be given an opportunity to demonstrate they are eligible for a collection alternative in order to obtain a face-to-face conference to discuss the alternative. Taxpayers will also be given an opportunity to become eligible for a collection alternative in order to obtain a face-to-face conference. For example, under the final regulations, if a taxpayer appears to have failed to file all required returns (and thus appears not to be eligible for an offer to compromise or an installment agreement), the taxpayer will be given an opportunity to demonstrate the inapplicability of the filing requirements or to file delinquent returns, in order to obtain a face-to-face conference. The final regulations further provide that a taxpayer’s eligibility for a collection alternative does not include the taxpayer’s ability to pay the unpaid tax.

The comments expressed concern that the amendment providing a face-to-face conference at an Appeals office other than an office in which all officers or employees had prior involvement could be construed as giving Appeals the discretion to deny a face-to-face conference even if the taxpayer would have been granted a face-to-face conference at the original location. The relevant sentence in A-D8 in the final regulations has been rewritten to make clear that Appeals does not have discretion to deny a face-to-face conference at an alternate location if the taxpayer would have been granted a face-to-face conference but for the disqualification of the Appeals employees at the original location.

The comments suggested that the regulations permit face-to-face conferences to be held not only at the Appeals office closest to the taxpayer’s residence or, for a business taxpayer, the taxpayer’s principal place of business, but also at the Appeals office closest to the taxpayer’s school or place of employment, the authorized representative’s place of business, or some other location convenient to the taxpayer or the taxpayer’s representative. The IRS and Treasury Department believe the rules for CDP hearings should be consistent with the treatment of other proceedings in Appeals. The long-standing practice of Appeals in cases not docketed in the Tax Court is to grant face-to-face conferences in the Appeals office closest to the taxpayer’s residence or principal place of business. The practice is retained in the final regulations. Appeals will, however, attempt to accommodate reasonable requests to hold the face-to-face conference at an Appeals office more convenient to the taxpayer.

The comments expressed concern that the definition of prior involvement under section 6320(b)(3) or 6330(b)(3) in the proposed regulations could be construed too narrowly in two ways. First, the definition of prior involvement as involvement in a prior hearing or proceeding could be read to exclude involvement in some informal settings, e.g., the Appeals officer’s participation in a mediation session. In order to clarify that no such limitation is intended, the final regulations substitute matter for hearing or proceeding in A-D4 of paragraph (d)(2). Second, defining prior involvement to exist when the Appeals officer previously considered the same tax liability could be construed as excluding from the definition instances in which the Appeals officer previously considered questions bearing only on collection issues. The final regulations adopt the suggestion in the comments to remove the word liability in A-D4 in order to eliminate the potential interpretation that there is a distinction between liability and collection issues in determining prior involvement.

The comments also requested that a mediation example be added to paragraph (d)(3). The IRS and the Treasury Department believe that the change made to A-D4 adequately clarifies the definition of prior involvement. This example and others will be added to the Internal Revenue Manual to ensure the proper administration of sections 6320(b)(3) and 6330(b)(3).

The comments recommended that the regulations address the treatment of ex parte communications during CDP hearings. The rules applicable to ex parte communications during CDP hearings and other Appeals proceedings are provided in Rev. Proc. 2000-43, 2000-2 C.B. 404. Therefore, these rules are not duplicated in the regulations under sections 6320 and 6330.

The comments recommended that the regulations be amended to provide that self-reported tax liabilities may be disputed in a CDP hearing. The final regulations adopt this recommendation. See also Montgomery v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 1 (2004), acq. 2005-51 I.R.B. 1152.

The comments also requested changes in the existing regulations’ interpretation of preclusive events under section 6330(c)(2)(B). Under section 6330(c)(2)(B), during a CDP hearing, a taxpayer may challenge the existence or amount of the underlying tax liability for any tax period if the person did not receive any statutory notice of deficiency for such tax liability or did not otherwise have an opportunity to dispute such tax liability. Section 6330(c)(2)(B) is made applicable to section 6320 hearings by section 6320(c). According to the comments, the only opportunity to dispute the tax liability that is sufficient to prevent the taxpayer from challenging the liability in a CDP hearing is the prior opportunity to dispute the liability in a judicial forum. The IRS and the Treasury Department believe that the existing regulations correctly include an opportunity for an Appeals conference as a preclusive prior opportunity. The text of section 6330(c)(2)(B) does not contain language limiting prior opportunities to judicial proceedings. Moreover, it is consistent for a taxpayer who has had an opportunity to obtain a determination of liability by Appeals in one administrative hearing to be precluded from obtaining an Appeals determination in a subsequent CDP administrative hearing with respect to the same liability. This interpretation of section 6330(c)(2)(B) has been upheld by the courts. See, e.g., Pelliccio v. United States, 253 F. Supp. 2d 258, 261-62 (D. Conn. 2003). Accordingly, the final regulations do not adopt this suggestion.

Alternatively, the comments also recommended that the regulations specify that a pre-CDP Appeals conference is not a prior opportunity to dispute liability under section 6330(c)(2)(B) if the receipt of the conference was conditioned upon the taxpayer’s agreement to extend the assessment statute of limitations with respect to the liability and the taxpayer declined to extend the statute. The IRS and Treasury Department believe this addition is unnecessary. For taxes subject to deficiency procedures, the relevant, pre-assessment “prior opportunity” is the receipt of the notice of deficiency. The offer of an Appeals conference prior to receipt of the notice of deficiency does not constitute an opportunity to dispute liability under section 6330(c)(2)(B). This interpretation of section 6330(c)(2)(B) has been added to paragraph (e)(3) A-E2 to remove any uncertainty about this matter. For liabilities not subject to deficiency procedures, the offer of an Appeals conference prior to assessment constitutes an opportunity to dispute the liability under section 6330(c)(2)(B). Appeals conferences to consider these types of liabilities are rarely conditioned upon an extension of the assessment statute of limitations. The IRS generally makes conditional offers of a conference only when a taxpayer makes an untimely request for review of a proposed Trust Fund Recovery Penalty pursuant to a Letter 1153 and less than one year remains on the assessment statute of limitations. In this circumstance, however, the opportunity for an Appeals conference offered in the Letter 1153 constitutes the opportunity to dispute the liability under section 6330(c)(2)(B). The conditional offer made after the expiration of the prior opportunity provided in the Letter 1153 is irrelevant. For these reasons, the final regulations do not adopt this comment.

The comments objected to the addition of a definition of administrative record to the regulations as an attempt to overrule the Tax Court’s decision in Robinette v. Commissioner, 123 T.C. 85 (2004), rev’d, 439 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 2006). The assumption that Robinette eliminated any role for an administrative record in CDP court proceedings is not supported by the Court’s opinion. While the Tax Court held in Robinette that it was not required to limit its abuse-of-discretion review to the administrative record, it did not reject the utility of an administrative record. Subsequent to the submission of the comments, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the Tax Court and held that abuse-of-discretion review in CDP cases is limited to the administrative record. Robinette v. Commissioner, 439 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 2006). For these reasons, it is important that taxpayers and the IRS have a common understanding of the scope of the administrative record. The definition is retained in the final regulations.

The comments suggested that the proposed definition of the administrative record permits Appeals officers and employees to exclude from the record for judicial review issues, arguments, and evidence presented orally by the taxpayer, and to exclude written communications and documents. The administrative record definition is not intended to suggest that the reviewing court is not permitted to determine the contents of the administrative record or the record’s adequacy in an individual case. The reviewing court has the authority to receive evidence concerning what happened during the CDP hearing. The definition is provided to establish for the benefit of the IRS and taxpayers a baseline description of what each administrative record should contain to ensure a record sufficient for judicial review. The final regulations have not been changed in this regard. The final regulations, however, adopt the suggestion that the description of the case file in A-D7 and in the definition of administrative record in A-F6 of the proposed regulations (redesignated as A-F4 in the final regulations) be made consistent.

The comments recommended that the final regulations require each Appeals officer to include in the notice of determination a list of the documents the Appeals officer believes are included in the administrative record. The justification for this proposed requirement is that the list would assist the taxpayer in deciding whether to seek judicial review. The list of documents, according to the comments, will also assist the court and taxpayers seeking review to more efficiently ascertain whether there was an abuse of discretion.

The final regulations do not adopt this recommendation. Requiring Appeals officers to prepare a list of documents constituting the administrative record in each of the thousands of cases handled each year would impose a heavy burden on Appeals without a commensurate benefit to taxpayers. The notice of determination issued in each case describes the facts and reasons supporting the Appeals officer’s determination and should provide an adequate basis for the taxpayer’s decision whether to seek judicial review.

The IRS and the Treasury Department acknowledge that disputes have arisen with respect to the contents of the administrative record in CDP cases and that there are no special rules in place to resolve these disputes. An appropriate solution could involve the Tax Court’s development of rules governing the preparation and submission of the administrative record for abuse-of-discretion review, particularly now that the recently-enacted Pension Protection Act of 2006 requires all CDP cases to be litigated in the Tax Court.

The comments suggested removal of the limitation in the existing regulations that a taxpayer is precluded from obtaining judicial review of an issue not raised with Appeals during the CDP hearing. As an alternative, the comments recommended that a taxpayer only be prevented from raising those issues the taxpayer could have, but failed to raise during the CDP hearing. The limitation in the existing regulations implements a basic principle of administrative law that those seeking review of an issue must first give the agency the opportunity to evaluate and respond to the issue. This limitation has been upheld in the courts. See Robinette v. Commissioner, 123 T.C. 85, 101-102 (2004), rev’d on other grounds, 439 F.3d 455 (8^th Cir. 2006); Magana v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 488, 493 (2002); Abu-Awad v. United States, 294 F. Supp. 2d 879, 889 (S.D. Tex. 2003). Accordingly, the final regulations do not adopt either of these recommendations.

The comments recommended that if the limitation on the taxpayer’s ability to raise new issues during judicial review is retained, then the amendment to A-F5 (redesignated as A-F3 in the final regulations) should clarify that a taxpayer need not provide the evidence specified by Appeals with respect to an issue in order to present “any evidence” necessary to properly raise the issue. The IRS and the Treasury Department believe this change is unnecessary. The revision to A-F5 (redesignated as A-F3) does not suggest that the “any evidence” needed to avoid preclusion must be the evidence specified by Appeals. The revised language simply requires that the taxpayer submit some evidentiary support. This suggestion is not adopted in the final regulations.

The comments also suggested adding that a taxpayer need not provide any evidence to avoid preclusion if the case file already contains evidence with respect to that issue. This addition is not necessary. If the case file contains all the information needed for a decision on an issue, an Appeals officer will not request any additional evidence and the revised language in A-F5 (redesignated as A-F3 in the final regulations) will not apply. In the unlikely event that an Appeals officer making a determination on an issue requested information already in the file, a reviewing court should find the taxpayer’s failure to provide any evidence does not prevent the issue from being raised. The final regulations do not adopt this recommendation.

The comments urged that the regulations make clear that the authority of Appeals officers to determine the validity, sufficiency and timeliness of a CDP notice does not alter or limit the authority of the reviewing court to make the same determination. The IRS and the Treasury Department believe this clarification is unnecessary. It is well-settled that reviewing courts have the authority to determine the validity, sufficiency and timeliness of a CDP notice. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 255 (2001). This clarification is not adopted in the final regulations.

The comments recommended that administrative rules similar to those developed under section 6015 be added to the regulations. The regulations state that a spousal defense raised under section 66 or 6015 is governed by section 66 or 6015 and the regulations and procedures thereunder. See Treas. Reg. § 301.6320-1(e)(2). To the extent it is determined that further guidance is necessary, such guidance will be in the form of additions to the Internal Revenue Manual. The final regulations do not adopt this recommendation.

The final regulations include amendments to the existing regulations to remove references to judicial review by United States district courts. The Pension Protection Act of 2006, Public Law 109-280, 120 Stat. 780, § 855 amended section 6330(d) to eliminate the jurisdiction of the district courts to review notices of determination, leaving the Tax Court with sole jurisdiction. Section 6330(d) is made applicable to section 6320 hearings by section 6320(c). To make clear in the regulations that judicial review is available only in the Tax Court, Q&A-F3 and Q&A-F4 in the existing regulations are removed by the final regulations and Q&A-F5 and Q&A-F6 in the proposed regulations are redesignated as Q&A-F3 and Q&A-F4 in the final regulations. In addition, only the Tax Court is now mentioned in A-E11, paragraph (f)(1), A-F1, redesignated Q&A-F3 and Q&A-F4, Example 1 of paragraph (g)(3), Q&A-H2 and redesignated Q-I6.

It has been determined that this Treasury decision is not a significant regulatory action as defined in Executive Order 12866. Therefore, a regulatory assessment is not required. It also has been determined that section 553(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. chapter 5) does not apply to these regulations. In particular, the IRS and the Treasury Department find for good cause that a notice of proposed rulemaking and solicitation of public comments are unnecessary to amend the existing regulations to implement the modification of section 6330(d) by the Pension Protection Act of 2006, Public Law 109-280, 120 Stat. 780. These amendments are made solely to conform the regulations to the statutory change enacted by Congress. The amendments do not involve any exercise of discretion or interpretation by the IRS or Treasury Department and the removal of United States district court jurisdiction would become effective even if the amendments were not made. Accordingly, the notice and public comment procedures do not apply. Because the regulations do not impose a collection of information on small entities, the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. chapter 6) does not apply. Pursuant to section 7805(f) of the Internal Revenue Code, the proposed regulations were submitted to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration for comment on its impact on small business.

Paragraph 1. The authority citation for part 301 continues to read, in part, as follows:

Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805 * * *

Par. 2. Section 301.6320-1 is amended as follows:

1. Paragraph (c)(2) A-C1, Q&A-C6 and A-C7 are revised.

2. Paragraph (d)(2) A-D4 and A-D7 are revised.

3. Paragraph (d)(2) Q&A-D8 is added.

4. Paragraph (d)(3) is added.

5. Paragraph (e)(1) is revised.

6. Paragraph (e)(3) A-E2, A-E6, A-E7 and A-E11 are revised.

7. Paragraph (f)(1) is revised.

8. Paragraph (f)(2) A-F1 is revised.

9. Paragraph (f)(2) Q&A-F3 is removed.

10. Paragraph (f)(2) Q&A-F5 is revised and redesignated Q&A-F3.

11. Paragraph (f)(2) Q&A-F4 is revised.

12. Paragraph (g)(3) Example 1 is revised.

13. Paragraph (h)(2) Q&A-H2 is revised.

14. Paragraph (i)(2) Q-I5 is revised and redesignated Q-I6.

15. Paragraph (i)(2) A-I5 is redesignated A-I6.

16. Paragraph (i)(2) Q&A-I1 through Q&A-I4 are redesignated Q&A-I2 through Q&A-I5.

17. Paragraph (i)(2) Q&A-I1 and Q&A-I7 through Q&A-I11 are added.

18. Paragraph (j) is revised.

This document contains amendments to the Regulations on Procedure and Administration (26 CFR part 301) relating to the provision of notice under section 6330 of the Internal Revenue Code to taxpayers of a right to a CDP hearing (CDP Notice) before or, in limited cases, after levy. Final regulations (T.D. 8980, 2002-1 C.B. 477) were published on January 18, 2002, in the Federal Register (67 FR 2549) (the 2002 final regulations). The 2002 final regulations implemented certain changes made by section 3401 of the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (Public Law 105-206, 112 Stat. 685) (RRA 1998), including the addition of section 6330 to the Internal Revenue Code.

Section 3401 of RRA 1998 also added section 6320 to the Internal Revenue Code. That statute provides for notice to taxpayers of a right to a hearing after the filing of a notice of Federal tax lien (NFTL). A number of the provisions in section 6330 concerning the conduct and judicial review of a CDP hearing are incorporated by reference in section 6320. On January 18, 2002, final regulations (T.D. 8979, 2002-1 C.B. 466) under section 6320 were published in the Federal Register (67 FR 2558) along with the 2002 final regulations under section 6330.

On September 16, 2005, the IRS and the Treasury Department published in the Federal Register (70 FR 54687) a notice of proposed rulemaking and notice of public hearing (REG-150091-02, 2005-43 I.R.B. 774). The IRS received one set of written comments responding to the notice of proposed rulemaking. Because no one requested to speak at the public hearing, the hearing was cancelled. After considering each of the comments, the proposed regulations are adopted as amended by this Treasury decision.

On August 17, 2006, the Pension Protection Act of 2006, Public Law 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (the PPA), was enacted. Section 855 of the PPA amended section 6330(d) of the Internal Revenue Code to withdraw judicial review of CDP notices of determination from United States district court jurisdiction, leaving review solely in the United States Tax Court. This amendment to section 6330(d), effective for notices of determination issued on or after October 17, 2006, requires the removal of references to district court review in the 2002 final regulations. This Treasury decision removes those references.

The IRS and the Treasury Department have determined that a notice of proposed rulemaking and solicitation of public comments are not required to amend the regulations to implement the modification to section 6330(d). These amendments are made solely to conform the regulations to a statutory change enacted by Congress. Because the amendments do not involve any exercise of discretion or interpretation, the notice and public comment procedures are unnecessary.

The comments and changes to the proposed regulations, and the amendments required by the Congressional modification to section 6330(d), are discussed below.

The comments suggested that the IRS be required to contact taxpayers who timely file an incomplete request for CDP hearing to give them the opportunity to perfect the request within a reasonable time period and further recommended that such contact be in writing and identify the infirmity requiring perfection. The comments also recommended that the final regulations establish a specific time period during which taxpayers may, by right, amend or perfect their previously-filed yet incomplete CDP hearing request. The request, according to the comments, should be considered timely if it is perfected within the applicable time period.

Currently, the practice of the IRS is to contact taxpayers whose hearing requests fail to satisfy the requirements specified by the existing regulations and ask these taxpayers to perfect their requests within a specified period of time. The IRS considers requests perfected within the time specified to be timely. The intention of the IRS and the Treasury Department is to incorporate this administrative procedure into the proposed regulations. The final regulations more clearly state that the IRS will make a reasonable attempt to contact taxpayers to give them a reasonable period of time to perfect incomplete requests. However, the timeframe in which to respond to the request, and the method of delivery of the request (i.e., orally or in writing) are more appropriately addressed in the Internal Revenue Manual. The final regulations make clear that requests perfected within the time period specified by the IRS will be considered timely.

The final regulations do not adopt the suggestion to establish a period of time during which a taxpayer is allowed to perfect an incomplete request, without regard to a perfection request from the IRS. The IRS and Treasury Department believe that the procedure incorporated into the final regulations is sufficient to permit taxpayers to ensure their requests are complete.

The comments recommended that the IRS Office of Appeals (Appeals) be given the discretion to permit a taxpayer to amend an imperfect hearing request after the period for perfecting the request has expired, if the taxpayer can demonstrate that such amendment furthers an alternative to collection. This change to the regulations is unnecessary because Appeals is already empowered to exercise this discretion. Neither the current regulations nor the proposed amendments limits Appeals from exercising this discretion. Accordingly, the final regulations do not adopt this recommendation. Further clarification, however, will be provided in the Internal Revenue Manual.

The comments suggested that where a taxpayer fails to perfect a CDP hearing request until after the time period specified by the IRS, the perfected request should be automatically treated as a request for an equivalent hearing. Treating untimely perfected requests as equivalent hearing requests may unduly prolong the process in cases in which a taxpayer does not want an equivalent hearing. Accordingly, the final regulations do not adopt this suggestion. The final regulations, however, provide that Appeals will determine the timeliness of CDP hearing requests. The final regulations also add to the proposed regulations that taxpayers making an untimely request will be provided the opportunity to have the request for CDP hearing treated as a request for equivalent hearing, without submitting an additional request.

The comments requested that the final regulations give taxpayers whose hearing requests might be construed as making a frivolous argument the right to amend their hearing requests to raise relevant, non-frivolous issues. The comments further recommended that all taxpayers be given the right to supplement the hearing request prior to the conference conducted by Appeals.

These comments indicate concern that taxpayers may be unable to articulate reasons for disagreeing with the collection action that are satisfactory to Appeals. The reasons for disagreeing with the collection action need not be detailed. To assist taxpayers in articulating reasons, the IRS is revising Form 12153, “Request for a Collection Due Process Hearing,” to add examples of the most common reasons taxpayers give for requesting a hearing, including requests for collection alternatives. In any event, the informal nature of the CDP hearing permits taxpayers and Appeals to discuss collection alternatives and issues not listed in the hearing request if such discussion will help resolve the case. Accordingly, the final regulations do not adopt these recommendations.

The comments urged that the final regulations guarantee a face-to-face conference for each taxpayer who presents a relevant, non-frivolous reason for disagreement with the collection action. If this recommendation is not adopted, the comments suggest that the regulations address and provide examples of when a face-to-face conference will not be granted. The final regulations do not adopt the recommendation to guarantee a face-to-face conference for each taxpayer raising a relevant, non-frivolous issue. The IRS and the Treasury Department agree with the comments that a face-to-face conference can be a useful forum for resolving a taxpayer’s issues. The final regulations recognize the importance of a face-to-face meeting by providing that taxpayers will ordinarily be offered an opportunity for a face-to-face conference. There will be instances, however, when a face-to-face conference is not practical. The final regulations identify typical situations in which a face-to-face conference will be neither necessary nor productive. Except for these situations, the IRS and the Treasury Department anticipate that Appeals will afford a face-to-face meeting to taxpayers who request one. Nonetheless, unanticipated circumstances may arise in which granting a face-to-face conference will not be appropriate. The final regulations give Appeals the flexibility needed to respond to unanticipated circumstances.

Adoption of the comment requesting guidance on when a face-to-face conference will not be granted is unnecessary. The final regulations retain descriptions of situations in which a face-to-face conference will not be granted, as illustrated in the proposed regulations. Further guidance on granting face-to-face conferences will be provided in the Internal Revenue Manual.

The comments suggested that a taxpayer who appears to be presenting only frivolous reasons be given an opportunity to provide relevant, non-frivolous reasons in order to obtain a face-to-face conference. Adoption of this recommendation is unnecessary. Correspondence sent by Appeals to taxpayers who make only frivolous arguments invites them to submit relevant, non-frivolous reasons. Appeals offers face-to-face conferences to taxpayers who respond by providing such reasons.

The comments also suggested that the regulations define relevant and frivolous. The IRS and the Treasury Department believe that any attempt to define these terms is unnecessary and could result in underinclusive definitions. For example, the comments suggest that a frivolous issue be defined as an issue that is the same or substantially similar to an issue identified as frivolous by the IRS in published guidance. It is not possible to anticipate or keep pace with the evolution of frivolous arguments through published guidance. Instead, taxpayers are advised to consult the lists of examples of frivolous arguments in IRS Publication 2105, “Why Do I Have to Pay Taxes” and on the IRS website in a document entitled “The Truth about Frivolous Tax Arguments.” The names and web addresses of these documents, and a toll-free number to order Publication 2105, will be added to the instructions to Form 12153 to help taxpayers avoid making these arguments.

The comments recommended clarification of the proposed rule that a face-to-face conference concerning a collection alternative will not be granted unless the alternative would be available to other taxpayers in similar circumstances. According to the comments, a taxpayer should not be denied a face-to-face conference because the requested collection alternative cannot be accepted, for example, because it appears from financial information that the taxpayer can pay the liabilities in full. This proposed rule was not intended to deny a face-to-face conference because the requested collection alternative would not be accepted. The intention of this rule is to permit the denial of a face-to-face conference to discuss a collection alternative for which the taxpayer is not eligible. A lack of eligibility under IRS policy is tied to a taxpayer’s compliance with the Federal tax laws, not to the taxpayer’s financial circumstances or ability to request the most appropriate alternative. For example, if the taxpayer has not filed all required tax returns, the taxpayer is not eligible for an offer to compromise or an installment agreement.

In response to the concerns expressed in the comments, the final regulations amplify the rule that a face-to-face conference to discuss a collection alternative will not be granted unless other taxpayers would be eligible for the alternative in similar circumstances. The final regulations provide in A-D8 that Appeals in its discretion may grant a face-to-face conference if Appeals determines that a face-to-face conference is appropriate to explain to the taxpayer the requirements for becoming eligible for a collection alternative. The final regulations also provide that taxpayers will be given an opportunity to demonstrate they are eligible for a collection alternative in order to obtain a face-to-face conference to discuss the alternative. Taxpayers will also be given an opportunity to become eligible for a collection alternative in order to obtain a face-to-face conference. For example, under the final regulations, if a taxpayer appears to have failed to file all required returns (and thus appears not to be eligible for an offer to compromise or an installment agreement), the taxpayer will be given an opportunity to demonstrate the inapplicability of the filing requirements or to file delinquent returns, in order to obtain a face-to-face conference. The final regulations further provide that a taxpayer’s eligibility for a collection alternative does not include the taxpayer’s ability to pay the unpaid tax.

The comments expressed concern that the amendment providing a face-to-face conference at an Appeals office other than an office in which all officers or employees had prior involvement could be construed as giving Appeals the discretion to deny a face-to-face conference even if the taxpayer would have been granted a face-to-face conference at the original location. The relevant sentence in A-D8 in the final regulations has been rewritten to make clear that Appeals does not have discretion to deny a face-to-face conference at an alternate location if the taxpayer would have been granted a face-to-face conference but for the disqualification of the Appeals employees at the original location.

The comments suggested that the regulations permit face-to-face conferences to be held not only at the Appeals office closest to the taxpayer’s residence or, for a business taxpayer, the taxpayer’s principal place of business, but also at the Appeals office closest to the taxpayer’s school or place of employment, the authorized representative’s place of business, or some other location convenient to the taxpayer or the taxpayer’s representative. The IRS and Treasury Department believe the rules for CDP hearings should be consistent with the treatment of other proceedings in Appeals. The long-standing practice of Appeals in cases not docketed in the Tax Court is to grant face-to-face conferences in the Appeals office closest to the taxpayer’s residence or principal place of business. The practice is retained in the final regulations. Appeals will, however, attempt to accommodate reasonable requests to hold the face-to-face conference at an Appeals office more convenient to the taxpayer.

The comments expressed concern that the definition of prior involvement under section 6320(b)(3) or 6330(b)(3) in the proposed regulations could be construed too narrowly in two ways. First, the definition of prior involvement as involvement in a prior hearing or proceeding could be read to exclude involvement in some informal settings, e.g., the Appeals officer’s participation in a mediation session. In order to clarify that no such limitation is intended, the final regulations substitute matter for hearing or proceeding in A-D4 of paragraph (d)(2). Second, defining prior involvement to exist when the Appeals officer previously considered the same tax liability could be construed as excluding from the definition instances in which the Appeals officer previously considered questions bearing only on collection issues. The final regulations adopt the suggestion in the comments to remove the word liability in A-D4 in order to eliminate the potential interpretation that there is a distinction between liability and collection issues in determining prior involvement.

The comments also requested that a mediation example be added to paragraph (d)(3). The IRS and the Treasury Department believe that the change made to A-D4 adequately clarifies the definition of prior involvement. This example and others will be added to the Internal Revenue Manual to ensure the proper administration of sections 6320(b)(3) and 6330(b)(3).

The comments recommended that the regulations address the treatment of ex parte communications during CDP hearings. The rules applicable to ex parte communications during CDP hearings and other Appeals proceedings are provided in Rev. Proc. 2000-43, 2000-2 C.B. 404. Therefore, these rules are not duplicated in the regulations under sections 6320 and 6330.

The comments recommended that the regulations be amended to provide that self-reported tax liabilities may be disputed in a CDP hearing. The final regulations adopt this recommendation. See also Montgomery v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 1 (2004), acq. 2005-51 I.R.B. 1152.

The comments also requested changes in the existing regulations’ interpretation of preclusive events under section 6330(c)(2)(B). Under section 6330(c)(2)(B), during a CDP hearing, a taxpayer may challenge the existence or amount of the underlying tax liability for any tax period if the person did not receive any statutory notice of deficiency for such tax liability or did not otherwise have an opportunity to dispute such tax liability. According to the comments, the only opportunity to dispute the tax liability that is sufficient to prevent the taxpayer from challenging the liability in a CDP hearing is the prior opportunity to dispute the liability in a judicial forum. The IRS and the Treasury Department believe that the existing regulations correctly include an opportunity for an Appeals conference as a preclusive prior opportunity. The text of section 6330(c)(2)(B) does not contain language limiting prior opportunities to judicial proceedings. Moreover, it is consistent for a taxpayer who has had an opportunity to obtain a determination of liability by Appeals in one administrative hearing to be precluded from obtaining an Appeals determination in a subsequent CDP administrative hearing with respect to the same liability. This interpretation of section 6330(c)(2)(B) has been upheld by the courts. See, e.g., Pelliccio v. United States, 253 F. Supp. 2d 258, 261-62 (D. Conn. 2003). Accordingly, the final regulations do not adopt this suggestion.

Alternatively, the comments recommended that the regulations specify that a pre-CDP Appeals conference is not a prior opportunity to dispute liability under section 6330(c)(2)(B) if the receipt of the conference was conditioned upon the taxpayer’s agreement to extend the assessment statute of limitations with respect to the liability and the taxpayer declined to extend the statute. The IRS and Treasury Department believe this addition is unnecessary. For taxes subject to deficiency procedures, the relevant, pre-assessment “prior opportunity” is the receipt of the notice of deficiency. The offer of an Appeals conference prior to receipt of the notice of deficiency does not constitute an opportunity to dispute the liability under section 6330(c)(2)(B). This interpretation of section 6330(c)(2)(B) has been added to paragraph (e)(3) A-E2 to remove any uncertainty about this matter. For liabilities not subject to deficiency procedures, the offer of an Appeals conference prior to assessment constitutes an opportunity to dispute the liability under section 6330(c)(2)(B). Appeals conferences to consider these types of liabilities are rarely conditioned upon an extension of the assessment statute of limitations. The IRS generally makes conditional offers of a conference only when a taxpayer makes an untimely request for review of a proposed Trust Fund Recovery Penalty pursuant to a Letter 1153 and less than one year remains on the assessment statute of limitations. In this circumstance, however, the opportunity for an Appeals conference offered in the Letter 1153 constitutes the opportunity to dispute the liability under section 6330(c)(2)(B). The conditional offer made after the expiration of the prior opportunity provided in the Letter 1153 is irrelevant. For these reasons, the final regulations do not adopt this comment.

The comments objected to the addition of a definition of administrative record to the regulations as an attempt to overrule the Tax Court’s decision in Robinette v. Commissioner, 123 T.C. 85 (2004), rev’d, 439 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 2006). The assumption that Robinette eliminated any role for an administrative record in CDP court proceedings is not supported by the Court’s opinion. While the Tax Court held in Robinette that it was not required to limit its abuse-of-discretion review to the administrative record, it did not reject the utility of an administrative record. Subsequent to the submission of the comments, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the Tax Court and held that abuse-of-discretion review in CDP cases is limited to the administrative record. Robinette v. Commissioner, 439 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 2006). For these reasons, it is important that taxpayers and the IRS have a common understanding of the scope of the administrative record. The definition is retained in the final regulations.

The comments suggested that the proposed definition of the administrative record permits Appeals officers and employees to exclude from the record for judicial review issues, arguments, and evidence presented orally by the taxpayer, and to exclude written communications and documents. The administrative record definition is not intended to suggest that the reviewing court is not permitted to determine the contents of the administrative record or the record’s adequacy in an individual case. The reviewing court has the authority to receive evidence concerning what happened during the CDP hearing. The definition is provided to establish for the benefit of the IRS and taxpayers a baseline description of what each administrative record should contain to ensure a record sufficient for judicial review. The final regulations have not been changed in this regard. The final regulations, however, adopt the suggestion that the description of the case file in A-D7 and in the definition of administrative record in A-F6 of the proposed regulations (redesignated as A-F4 in the final regulations) be made consistent.

The comments recommended that the final regulations require each Appeals officer to include in the notice of determination a list of the documents the Appeals officer believes are included in the administrative record. The justification for this proposed requirement is that the list would assist the taxpayer in deciding whether to seek judicial review. The list of documents, according to the comments, will also assist the court and taxpayers seeking review to more efficiently ascertain whether there was an abuse of discretion.

The final regulations do not adopt this recommendation. Requiring Appeals officers to prepare a list of documents constituting the administrative record in each of the thousands of cases handled each year would impose a heavy burden on Appeals without a commensurate benefit to taxpayers. The notice of determination issued in each case describes the facts and reasons supporting the Appeals officer’s determination and should provide an adequate basis for the taxpayer’s decision whether to seek judicial review.

The IRS and the Treasury Department acknowledge that disputes have arisen with respect to the contents of the administrative record in CDP cases and that there are no special rules in place to resolve these disputes. An appropriate solution could involve the Tax Court’s development of rules governing the preparation and submission of the administrative record for abuse-of-discretion review, particularly now that the recently-enacted Pension Protection Act of 2006 requires all CDP cases to be litigated in the Tax Court.

The comments suggested removal of the limitation in the existing regulations that a taxpayer is precluded from obtaining judicial review of an issue not raised with Appeals during the CDP hearing. As an alternative, the comments recommended that a taxpayer only be prevented from raising those issues the taxpayer could have, but failed to raise during the CDP hearing. The limitation in the existing regulations implements a basic principle of administrative law that those seeking review of an issue must first give the agency the opportunity to evaluate and respond to the issue. This limitation has been upheld in the courts. See Robinette v. Commissioner, 123 T.C. 85, 101-102 (2004), rev’d on other grounds, 439 F.3d 455 (8^th Cir. 2006); Magana v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 488, 493 (2002); Abu-Awad v. United States, 294 F. Supp. 2d 879, 889 (S.D. Tex. 2003). Accordingly, the final regulations do not adopt either of these recommendations.

The comments recommended that if the limitation on the taxpayer’s ability to raise new issues during judicial review is retained, then the amendment to A-F5 (redesignated as A-F3 in the final regulations) should clarify that a taxpayer need not provide the evidence specified by Appeals with respect to an issue in order to present “any evidence” necessary to properly raise the issue. The IRS and the Treasury Department believe this change is unnecessary. The revision to A-F5 (redesignated as A-F3) does not suggest that the “any evidence” needed to avoid preclusion must be the evidence specified by Appeals. The revised language simply requires that the taxpayer submit some evidentiary support. This suggestion is not adopted in the final regulations.

The comments also suggested adding that a taxpayer need not provide any evidence to avoid preclusion if the case file already contains evidence with respect to that issue. This addition is not necessary. If the case file contains all the information needed for a decision on an issue, an Appeals officer will not request any additional evidence and the revised language in A-F5 (redesignated as A-F3 in the final regulations) will not apply. In the unlikely event that an Appeals officer making a determination on an issue requested information already in the file, a reviewing court should find the taxpayer’s failure to provide any evidence does not prevent the issue from being raised. The final regulations do not adopt this recommendation.

The comments urged that the regulations make clear that the authority of Appeals officers to determine the validity, sufficiency and timeliness of a CDP notice does not alter or limit the authority of the reviewing court to make the same determination. The IRS and the Treasury Department believe this clarification is unnecessary. It is well-settled that reviewing courts have the authority to determine the validity, sufficiency and timeliness of a CDP notice. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 255 (2001). This clarification is not adopted in the final regulations.

The comments recommended that administrative rules similar to those developed under section 6015 be added to the regulations. The regulations state that a spousal defense raised under section 66 or 6015 is governed by section 66 or 6015 and the regulations and procedures thereunder. See Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(e)(2). To the extent it is determined that further guidance is necessary, such guidance will be in the form of additions to the Internal Revenue Manual. The final regulations do not adopt this recommendation.

The final regulations include amendments to the existing regulations to remove references to judicial review by United States district courts. The Pension Protection Act of 2006, Public Law 109-280, 120 Stat. 780, § 855 amended section 6330(d) to eliminate the jurisdiction of the district courts to review notices of determination, leaving the Tax Court with sole jurisdiction. For this reason, Q&A-F3 and Q&A-F4 in the existing regulations are removed by the final regulations and Q&A-F5 and Q&A-F6 in the proposed regulations are redesignated as Q&A-F3 and Q&A-F4 in the final regulations. In addition, only the Tax Court is now mentioned in A-E11, paragraph (f)(1), A-F1, redesignated Q&A-F3 and Q&A-F4, Example 1 of paragraph (g)(3), Q&A-H2 and redesignated Q-I6.

It has been determined that this Treasury decision is not a significant regulatory action as defined in Executive Order 12866. Therefore, a regulatory assessment is not required. It also has been determined that section 553(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. chapter 5) does not apply to these regulations. In particular, the IRS and the Treasury Department find for good cause that a notice of proposed rulemaking and solicitation of public comments are unnecessary to amend the existing regulations to implement the modification of section 6330(d) by the Pension Protection Act of 2006, Public Law 109-280, 120 Stat. 780. These amendments are made solely to conform the regulations to the statutory change enacted by Congress. The amendments do not involve any exercise of discretion or interpretation by the IRS or Treasury Department and the removal of United States district court jurisdiction would become effective even if the amendments were not made. Accordingly, the notice and public comment procedures do not apply. Because the regulations do not impose a collection of information on small entities, the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. chapter 6) does not apply. Pursuant to section 7805(f) of the Internal Revenue Code, the proposed regulations were submitted to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration for comment on its impact on small business.

Paragraph 1. The authority citation for part 301 continues to read, in part, as follows:

Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805 * * *

Par. 2. Section 301.6330-1 is amended as follows:

1. Paragraph (c)(2) A-C1, Q&A-C6 and A-C7 are revised.

2. Paragraph (d)(2) A-D4 and A-D7 are revised.

3. Paragraph (d)(2) Q&A-D8 is added.

4. Paragraph (d)(3) is added.

5. Paragraph (e)(1) is revised.

6. Paragraph (e)(3) A-E2, A-E6, A-E7 and A-E11 are revised.

7. Paragraph (f)(1) is revised.

8. Paragraph (f)(2) A-F1 is revised.

9. Paragraph (f)(2) Q&A-F3 is removed.

10. Paragraph (f)(2) Q&A-F5 is revised and redesignated Q&A-F3.

11. Paragraph (f)(2) Q&A-F4 is revised.

12. Paragraph (g)(3) Example 1 is revised.

13. Paragraph (h)(2) Q&A-H2 is revised.

14. Paragraph (i)(2) Q-I5 is revised and redesignated Q-I6.

15. Paragraph (i)(2) A-I5 is redesignated A-I6.

16. Paragraph (i)(2) Q&A-I1 through Q&A-I4 are redesignated Q&A-I2 through Q&A-I5

17. Paragraph (i)(2) Q&A-I1 and Q&A-I7 through Q&A-I11 are added.

18. Paragraph (j) is revised.

Section 7702(a) of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) provides that, for a contract to qualify as a life insurance contract for Federal income tax purposes, the contract must be a life insurance contract under the applicable law and must either (1) satisfy the cash value accumulation test of section 7702(b), or (2) both meet the guideline premium requirements of section 7702(c) and fall within the cash value corridor of section 7702(d). To determine whether a contract satisfies the cash value accumulation test, or meets the guideline premium requirements and falls within the cash value corridor, it is necessary to determine the attained age of the insured.

A contract meets the cash value accumulation test of section 7702(b) if, by the terms of the contract, the cash surrender value of the contract may not at any time exceed the net single premium that would have to be paid at that time to fund future benefits under the contract. Under section 7702(e)(1)(B), the maturity date of the contract is deemed to be no earlier than the day on which the insured attains age 95, and no later than the day on which the insured attains age 100, for purposes of applying the cash value accumulation test.

A contract meets the guideline premium requirements of section 7702(c) if the sum of the premiums paid under the contract does not at any time exceed the greater of the guideline single premium or the sum of the guideline level premiums as of such time. The guideline single premium is the premium that is needed at the time the policy is issued to fund the future benefits under the contract based on the following three elements enumerated in section 7702(c)(3)(B):

(i) Reasonable mortality charges that meet the requirements (if any) prescribed in regulations and that (except as provided in regulations) do not exceed the mortality charges specified in the prevailing commissioners’ standard tables (as defined in section 807(d)(5)) as of the time the contract is issued;

(ii) Any reasonable charges (other than mortality charges) that (on the basis of the company’s experience, if any, with respect to similar contracts) are reasonably expected to be actually paid; and

(iii) Interest at the greater of an annual effective rate of six percent or the rate or rates guaranteed on issuance of the contract.

The guideline level premium is the level annual amount, payable over a period not ending before the insured attains age 95, computed on the same basis as the guideline single premium but using a minimum interest rate of four percent, rather than six percent. Like the cash value accumulation test, the guideline premium requirements are applied by deeming the maturity date of the contract to be no earlier than the day on which the insured attains age 95, and no later than the day on which the insured attains age 100. The deemed maturity date generally is the determination date set forth in the contract or the end of the mortality table (which, when section 7702 was enacted in 1984, was age 100).

A contract falls within the cash value corridor if the death benefit of the contract at any time is not less than the applicable percentage of the cash surrender value. The applicable percentage is determined based on the attained age of the insured as of the beginning of the contract year, as follows:

The Code does not define the attained age of the insured for purposes of applying the cash value corridor, the guideline premium limitations, or the computational rules of section 7702(e). The Senate Finance Committee explanation of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Public Law 98-369 (98 Stat. 494), however, states that the attained age of the insured means the insured’s age determined by reference to contract anniversaries (rather than the individual’s actual birthdays), so long as the age assumed under the contract is within 12 months of the actual age. See S. Prt. No. 98-169, Vol. 1, at 576 (1984).

Section 7702A defines a modified endowment contract (MEC) as a contract that meets the requirements of section 7702 (that is, a contract that is a life insurance contract), but that fails to meet the 7-pay test set forth in section 7702A(b). A contract fails to meet the 7-pay test if the accumulated amount paid under the contract at any time during the first 7 contract years exceeds the sum of the net level premiums that would have been paid on or before that time if the contract provided for paid-up future benefits after the payment of 7 level annual premiums. Section 7702A(c)(1)(B) provides that, for purposes of this test, the computational rules of section 7702(e) generally apply, including the contract’s deemed maturity no earlier than the day on which the insured attains age 95, and no later than the day on which the insured attains age 100.

In sum, the attained age of an insured under a contract that is a life insurance contract under the applicable law must be determined to test whether the contract complies with the guideline premium requirements of section 7702(c), the cash value corridor of section 7702(d), and (by reason of the computational rules of section 7702(e)) the cash value accumulation test of section 7702(b) and the 7-pay test of section 7702A(b), as applicable.

On May 24, 2005, the IRS and Treasury Department published a notice of proposed rulemaking (REG-168892-03, 2005-25 I.R.B. 1293, June 20, 2005) in the Federal Register (70 FR 29671) (the proposed regulations). The proposed regulations provide guidance on how to determine the attained age of an individual insured under a contract that is a life insurance contract under the applicable law, for purposes of testing whether the contract qualifies as a life insurance contract under section 7702 and is a modified endowment contract under section 7702A. Under the proposed regulations, the attained age of the insured is either (i) the insured’s age determined by reference to the individual’s actual birthday as of the date of determination (actual age) or (ii) the insured’s age determined by reference to contract anniversary (rather than the individual’s actual birthday), so long as the age assumed under the contract (contract age) is within 12 months of the actual age. The proposed regulations provide that the attained age of the insured under a contract insuring multiple lives on a last-to-die basis is the attained age of the youngest insured, and the attained age of the insured under a contract insuring multiple lives on a first-to-die basis is the attained age of the oldest insured.

The sole party requesting a public hearing timely withdrew its request. One written comment regarding the notice of proposed rulemaking was received.

After consideration of the written comment received, this Treasury decision adopts the regulations as proposed, with the modifications noted below.

It has been determined that this Treasury decision is not a significant regulatory action as defined in Executive Order 12866. Therefore, a regulatory assessment is not required. It also has been determined that section 553(b) and (d) of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. chapter 5) does not apply to these regulations, and because the regulations do not impose a collection of information on small entities, the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. chapter 6) does not apply. Pursuant to section 7805(f) of the Code, the notice of proposed rulemaking preceding this Treasury decision was submitted to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration for comment on its impact on small business.

Paragraph 1. The authority citation for part 1 is amended by adding entries in numerical order to read as follows:

Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805 * * *

Section 1.7702-2 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 7702(k). * * *

Par. 2. Section 1.7702-0 is added to read as follows:

The “old-law” contribution and benefit base for 2007 is $72,600. This is the base that would have been effective under the Act without the enactment of the 1977 amendments.

The “old-law” contribution and benefit base is used by:

(a) The Railroad Retirement program to determine certain tax liabilities and tier II benefits payable under that program to supplement the tier I payments which correspond to basic Social Security benefits,

(b) the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation to determine the maximum amount of pension guaranteed under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (as stated in section 230(d) of the Social Security Act),

(c) Social Security to determine a year of coverage in computing the special minimum benefit, as described earlier, and

(d) Social Security to determine a year of coverage (acquired whenever earnings equal or exceed 25 percent of the “old-law” base for this purpose only) in computing benefits for persons who are also eligible to receive pensions based on employment not covered under section 210 of the Act.

The minimum amount a domestic worker must earn so that such earnings are covered under Social Security or Medicare is the domestic employee coverage threshold. For 2007, this threshold is $1,500. Section 3121(x) of the Internal Revenue Code provides the formula for increasing the threshold.

Under the formula, the domestic employee coverage threshold amount for 2007 shall be equal to the 1995 amount of $1,000 multiplied by the ratio of the national average wage index for 2005 to that for 1993. If the resulting amount is not a multiple of $100, it shall be rounded to the next lower multiple of $100.

Multiplying the 1995 domestic employee coverage threshold amount ($1,000) by the ratio of the national average wage index for 2005 ($36,952.94) to that for 1993 ($23,132.67) produces the amount of $1,597.44. We then round this amount to $1,500. Accordingly, the domestic employee coverage threshold amount is $1,500 for 2007.