This section provides revenue officers with guidance, procedures and legal references relating to administrative summonses.

Purpose: Acquaint revenue officers with the basic legal concepts governing the use and enforcement of administrative summonses. For more detailed guidance, refer to the Summons Handbook at IRM 25.5.

Audience: Revenue Officers.

Policy Owner: Director, Collection Policy, SB/SE.

Program Owner: Collection Policy Enforcement, SB/SE.

Primary Stakeholders: Field Collection, CEASO, SB/SE Counsel.

Program Goals: Summonses are used to secure desired records, testimony, or other information when the taxpayer or other witness will not produce them voluntarily. By following the procedures provided in this IRM, a revenue officer will be able to properly prepare and serve a summons to secure information and/or testimony that may be enforced by court order when necessary.

IRC 7602(a) authorizes the IRS to issue a summons to any person to produce for examination by the IRS any books, papers, records, or other data, and to require such person to give such testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or material to the determination or collection of any internal revenue tax.

The question of what "may be relevant or material" depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. The Supreme Court has construed the words "may be relevant" as reflecting an express intent by Congress to allow the IRS to obtain items of even "potential relevance" to an ongoing investigation. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 814 (1984). At the same time, courts generally will not allow the IRS to use a summons as a mere fishing expedition. The test is whether the summoned documents or testimony "might have thrown light upon" the subject under legitimate inquiry.

When information or documents are sought from the taxpayer, all records of financial transactions, all books and records showing the receipt or expenditure of money by the taxpayer, and all financial transactions of the taxpayer with other persons and the names of such other persons to verify such transactions generally satisfy the relevance test of IRC 7602.

Where information or documents are requested from third persons, all records or information of the taxpayer’s financial transactions with such third persons or other persons generally satisfy the relevance test of IRC 7602.

Delegation Order 25-1 (Rev. 1) provides detailed instructions concerning the levels of authority delegated to various IRS officials to approve and perform activities concerning summonses. See IRM 1.2.2.15.1, Delegation Order 25-1 (Rev. 1), Summonses, Oaths, Certifications and Related Functions. Revenue officers should refer directly to the most current revision of Delegation Order 25-1 whenever an issue arises about their authority to take any of these actions:

IRC 7603(a) provides that books and records sought must be described with reasonable certainty. Include the periods for which the records are sought. In general, the meaning of the phrase "reasonable certainty" is a factual matter that will depend on all the circumstances involved.

A demand for documents required to be produced for examination cannot be so general and vague that it would be unreasonable to expect the summoned party to comply. The rule established by the courts is that the IRS employee issuing the summons need not describe in minute detail every document and paper to be produced but must describe the documents with reasonable certainty so the person summoned will have sufficient information to inform them of what is required to be produced. Adamowicz v. United States, 531 F.3d 151, 157-58 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Medlin, 986 F.2d 463, 467 (11th Cir. 1993).

In United States v. Calhoun County Hospital, Inc., 35 AFTR2d 75-1097 (N.D. Miss. 1974), the typed-in body of the summons did not specify for what years the records were sought. The court rejected the petitioner's argument that the summons was facially invalid by looking at the "four corners" of the summons, and thereby construed the summons to encompass records for the tax years at issue.

If it is not known what records are in the summoned party's possession, a summons can be served identifying only the taxpayer, the tax period under investigation, and the type of tax involved.

See IRM 25.5.2.4, Description of Information Requested, for examples.

IRC 7609 contains notice and waiting period requirements which apply to all third-party summonses, except for certain limited categories discussed herein. See IRM 5.17.6.5.2, Notice and Waiting Period Requirements, for a discussion of these notice and waiting periods.

When a third-party summons is issued, section 7609(a) requires notice be given to the taxpayer identified in the heading of the summons and any other person (whether an individual or an entity) identified in the description of summoned records. The term identified means identified by proper name (including an acronym derived from the proper name).

The notice and waiting period requirements of IRC 7609(a) apply to third-party summonses that seek the production of any type of records or giving of testimony regarding the person(s) identified in the summons.

Any noticee may intervene in any proceeding brought by the Government to enforce the summons. See IRC 7609(b)(1). Any notice may bring a proceeding to quash per IRC 7609(b)(2)(A). The summoned third-party has the right to intervene in any proceeding brought by a noticee to quash the summons. See IRC 7609(b)(2)(C).

The notice procedures apply to almost all third-party summonses issued for examination purposes. Therefore, the IRS must accurately distinguish between third-party summonses and summonses served on the taxpayer under investigation. The IRS must also determine if the summons is excepted from notice under IRC 7609(c)(2). IRM 5.17.6.5(2), Third-Party Summonses Subject to IRC 7609, discusses the exceptions to notice requirements.

When a third party indicates that they will voluntarily provide information but requests the service of a summons as evidence of their legal duty to testify or produce records, revenue officers should follow the notice and waiting period requirements of IRC 7609 when issuing the summons unless the summons is a collection summons and therefore excepted from these requirements by IRC 7609(c)(2). Revenue officers should not accept the voluntary production of records before the waiting period expires.

In most situations, the distinction between a third-party summons and a first-party summons, served on the taxpayer, is obvious. However, it is less obvious in at least three scenarios.

The notice and waiting period requirements of IRC 7609 apply to all summonses except:

Field collection employees will use the ICS Summons tool to document how and when the notice was given. The ICS summons tool systemically generates an ICS history entry. Document any additional information regarding the summons notice in ICS history.

The procedural rules applicable to third-party summonses issued under IRC 7609(a) do not apply to collection summonses that pertain to an assessed liability, transferee liability, or a liability reduced to judgment. See IRC 7609(c)(2)(D); Ginsburg v. United States, 90 AFTR 2d 2002-6555 (D. Conn. 2002) and Polselli v. Internal Revenue Service, 598 U.S. 432 (2023).

Third-party summonses issued as part of a DEL RET investigation, for trust fund recovery penalties (TFRP - pre-assessment investigations) or any other investigation where no liability has been assessed are not considered collection summonses under IRC 7609(c)(2)(D). Accordingly, IRS must follow the notice and waiting period requirements of IRC 7609(a) for these summonses.

If the IRS summons an entity’s bank account for evidence in support of a trust fund recovery penalty (TFRP) determination, the IRS must issue a separate summons for each known person who is potentially liable for a TFRP. The IRS should not issue a summons that lists the names of all potentially responsible persons for the TFRP in the heading of one summons and provide redacted notice copies to the noticees.

Notification is not required for third-party summonses issued for BAL DUE accounts, or any other investigation where an assessed liability exists for each of the periods at issue, and the summons is issued in aid of collection of those assessments.

Notice is required for third-party summonses issued for a Del Ret investigation where no liability is assessed.

IRC 7602(c)(1), Notice of Contact of Third Parties – General Notice, was significantly modified by section 1206 of the Taxpayer First Act of 2019, P.L. 116-25, effective August 16, 2019. Before an IRS employee initiates contact with third parties for the determination or collection of a taxpayer’s tax liabilities, the IRS must provide the taxpayer, at least 45 days before the third-party contact, with advance notice which informs the taxpayer that the IRS intends to make third-party contacts within a specified time period not to exceed one year. Such advance notice of third-party contacts may be renewed by the IRS, again by notice given 45 days in advance of the new specified period in which the IRS continues to intend to make third-party contacts. IRC 7602(c) also requires the IRS to make a record of persons contacted and provide that record to the taxpayer upon the taxpayer’s request.

Absent jeopardy circumstances, a revenue officer may not contact any third party without the IRS having first provided the taxpayer with the advance notice described in the preceding paragraph, at least 45 days before an IRS intended third party contact. There are several versions of Letter 3164 that can be used to advise a taxpayer in advance that the IRS intends to contact a third party within a specified period, not to exceed one year at a time. The most common versions of Letter 3164 used by revenue officers are

Refer to IRM 25.27.1, Third-Party Contact Program, for detailed guidance on third-party contacts.

IRC 7605(b) prohibits unnecessary examinations or investigations of a taxpayer and limits the IRS to one inspection of a taxpayer’s books of account for each taxable year unless the taxpayer requests otherwise, or unless the Secretary or their delegate, after investigation, determines that further inspection is necessary and notifies the taxpayer in writing of this determination.

An examination of the taxpayer’s books for the purpose of collecting the tax after an examination to determine the liability is considered to be a new investigation not subject to the restrictions of IRC 7605(b).

Banks and other financial institutions have sometimes argued that producing records of a taxpayer’s financial transactions pursuant to a summons would violate the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 USC 1681 et seq. (1970). To protect consumers’ interests, the FCRA restricts the circumstances under which a "consumer reporting agency" may furnish a "consumer report" to third parties, including the IRS.

A "consumer reporting agency" is defined as "any person which for monetary fees or on a cooperative nonprofit basis regularly engages in whole or in part in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or other information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties, and which uses any means or facility of interstate commerce for the purpose of preparing or furnishing consumer reports." See 15 USC 1681a(f). A bank may be considered a "consumer reporting agency" if it meets the above definition.

The FCRA specifically excludes from its definition of a "consumer report" any report containing information solely as to transactions or experiences between the consumer and the person making the report. See 15 USC 1681a(d)(2)(A)(i). Thus, information relating only to the bank and its customer (which is generally what the IRS seeks) is not covered by the Act, and the bank can produce this summoned information without violating the FCRA. United States v. Lake County National Bank, 35 AFTR2d 75-1428 (N.D. Ohio 1975); United States v. Bremicker, 365 F. Supp. 701 (D. Minn. 1973).

The IRS can obtain a full credit report pursuant to 31 USC 3711(h)(2) without issuing a summons when the IRS has:

Some cases handled by revenue officers begin as tax delinquency investigations (Del Ret), such as when the investigation begins before there is an assessed tax liability, usually because the taxpayer failed to file a tax return. In these cases, the IRS must issue a summons to obtain a credit report and cannot lawfully request a credit report informally. See 31 USC 3711(h) and the FCRA 15 USC 1681b. The IRS can receive a full credit report by obtaining the consumer's written permission or by issuing a summons. A summons satisfies the permissible circumstance requirement of 15 USC 1681b(a)(1), which provides that a consumer reporting agency may furnish a full credit report "[i]n response to the order of a court having jurisdiction to issue such an order" . The IRS takes the position that a third-party recordkeeper summons satisfies the court order requirement in 15 USC 1681b(a)(1) because IRC 7603(b)(2)(B) specifically contemplates the IRS issuing a third-party summons to a consumer reporting agency under the FCRA. IRC 7609(i) protects a third party that responds to a summons if the person entitled to notice of the summons does not file a timely petition to quash with the district court. 15 USC 1681b(a)(1) does not require the IRS to be a creditor of the taxpayer before acquiring a full credit report by summons.

Any question concerning the scope of the Fair Credit Reporting Act or its application to specific situations should be referred to Area Counsel. See also IRM 5.1.18.19, Consumer Credit Reports, for additional information on obtaining credit reports.

The First Amendment to the Constitution guarantees the right of free expression; this includes the right to assemble freely; freedom of the press; freedom of religion; and freedom of speech.

The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Unlike the Fifth Amendment, discussed below, corporations and other organizations are entitled to the protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment.

The Fifth Amendment affords a person a privilege against self-incrimination. It applies to both documentary requests and requests for oral testimony. There are different analyses for each type of request.

Area Counsel should be contacted in any case where the taxpayer raises a constitutional defense to summons enforcement, or for any question concerning the application of a constitutional argument to a specific situation.

The type of information sought by a revenue officer through the issuance of a summons generally does not tend to develop criminal potential of a case. Therefore, it is not mandatory that the person summoned be informed of their constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. In any case in which the revenue officer believes the criminal potential is so manifest that a warning may be appropriate, Area Counsel should be contacted.

Certain confidential relationships between a taxpayer and a witness or another person may give rise to a claim of a privilege from testifying or providing information pursuant to a summons. In the context of IRS summonses, federal law governs the determination of whether a particular matter is privileged. Questions concerning the validity of a privilege or its applicability to a particular situation should be referred to Area Counsel.

A person cannot successfully refuse to testify or provide information solely on the basis that the person stands in a confidential relationship with another person. The burden is on the witness first to establish the facts on which the asserted privilege is based and then to demonstrate how, and the extent to which, the requested information is covered by the privilege. See United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961).

The holder of a privilege may forfeit a privilege by failing to assert it or by expressly (or implicitly) waiving it. See Fed.R. Evid. 502; Hunt v Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464 (1888); Cotton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 637 (2d Cir. 1962), citing United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950).

In general, communications from a taxpayer to an attorney made in confidence for the purpose of obtaining legal advice are privileged, and the attorney cannot be compelled to disclose that information to the IRS. See 8 Wigmore, Evidence 2291 (McNaughton rev. 1961); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass.1950). Also, if the taxpayer creates records to facilitate the exchange of privileged communications with the attorney, those records are privileged. United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1041 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Bartlett, 449 F.2d 700, 703 (8th Cir. 1971). However, if a taxpayer turns over pre-existing records to an attorney, the IRS can obtain those records by summons, unless the records were otherwise privileged from production while in the taxpayer’s possession. Id.

As the foregoing information suggests, the attorney-client privilege is not all-inclusive and does not protect everything an attorney may do for a client. The privilege is confined to communications made in confidence by the client for the purpose of obtaining legal advice from an attorney. United States v. Rockwell International, 897 F.2d 1255 (3d Cir. 1990). The client in a corporate setting may be any officer or employee of the corporation. Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). Also, underlying factual information can be obtained from the employees whether or not this same information has been communicated to the corporation’s attorney. Books and records of a taxpayer are not privileged merely because they are in the hands of their attorney. If the records were compellable from the taxpayer, the taxpayer cannot cloak them with the privilege by transferring them to an attorney. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976).

Ministerial or clerical services are not within the attorney-client privilege. Records of financial transactions involving monies paid by or on behalf of a client to an attorney are not covered by the privilege. When an attorney acts as the client’s business advisor, or agent for the receipt or disbursement of money or property to or from third parties, the attorney is not acting in a legal capacity and records of such transactions are not privileged. United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 862 (1981). The identity of a client or the fact that a given individual has become a client are matters which are not usually within the privilege in the absence of special circumstances. United States v. BDO Seidman, 337 F.3d 802 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP, 2004-2 USTC 50,289 (N.D. Ill. 2004).

The preparation of a tax return is primarily an accounting service. When an attorney prepares a client’s tax returns, the workpapers produced by the attorney while preparing the returns and the tax records on which they are based are not shielded by the attorney-client privilege. Colton v. United States, 306 F.2nd 633, 638 (2nd Cir. 1962); United States v. Under Seal, 748 F.2d 871, 877 n8 (4th Cir. 1984); United States v. Lawless, 709 F.2d 485, 487 (7th Cir. 1983) ("When information is transmitted to an attorney with the intent that the information will be transmitted to a third party (in this case on a tax return), such information is not confidential." ); United States v. Frederick,182 F.3d 496 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Pipkins, 528 F.2d 559, 563 (5th Cir. 1976) ("[C]ourts have refused to apply the privilege to information that the client intends his attorney to impart to others." ). The same is true of the communications between the client and the attorney about the return being prepared. Id.

The work-product doctrine protects documents prepared by an attorney acting for their client in anticipation of or for use in litigation. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); United States v. Textron, Inc., 577 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1981); Hodges, Grant & Kaufmann v. United States, 768 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1985); Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(3) (protecting against disclosure the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation).

This doctrine applies to IRS summonses. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981); Borstein v. United States, 977 F.2d 112 (4th Cir 1992).

The obligation imposed by a tax summons remains subject to traditional privileges and limitations, United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707 (1980). Nothing in the language or legislative history of the IRS summons provisions suggests an intent on the part of Congress to preclude application of the doctrine to tangible things constituting attorney work product, absent a showing by the IRS of substantial need and inability to obtain the equivalent without undue hardship.

In United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194 (2d Cir. 1998), the Second Circuit held that work product protection should be granted if the document could fairly be said to have been prepared "because of" anticipated litigation. In order to determine whether a document was prepared because of anticipated litigation, a court should look to the purpose or function for which a document was prepared, rather than to the content of the document. United States v. Textron, Inc., 577 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Roxworthy, 457 F.3d 590 (6th Cir. 2006).

Prior to the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 ("RRA 1998" ), the accountant-client privilege was only provided by law in some states; it was not recognized in federal law. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973); United States v. Arthur Young, 465 U.S. 805 (1984). With the enactment of IRC 7525 by RRA 1998, the attorney-client privilege was extended to include communications between a taxpayer and a federally authorized tax practitioner, including a certified public accountant, to the extent that such communications would be considered privileged communications if they were between a taxpayer and an attorney.

IRC 7525 extends the application of the attorney-client privilege to communications between a taxpayer and any federally authorized tax practitioner with respect to tax advice to the extent the communication would be considered a privileged communication if it were between a taxpayer and an attorney. The law merely extends the application of the attorney-client privilege to other individuals; it does not modify the attorney-client privilege of confidentiality. Thus, as with the attorney-client privilege, information disclosed to an authorized practitioner acting beyond the capacity of providing confidential federal tax law advice will not be privileged. United States v. KPMG, LLP, 316 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2004).

The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 amended IRC 7525(b) by providing that the tax practitioner privilege does not apply to written communications in connection with the promotion of the direct or indirect participation of any person in any tax shelter. Prior to this amendment, the exception to the privilege was limited to written communications of this type regarding corporate tax shelters. The Government has the burden to prove preliminary facts in support of the IRC 7525(b) exception to the privilege. United States v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 492 F.3d 806 (7th Cir. 2007). Promotion of a taxpayer’s participation in a tax shelter means simply furtherance or encouragement, and is not limited to the marketing of a pre-packaged, one-size-fits-all tax shelter product. Valero Energy Corp. v. United States, 569 F.3d 626 (7th Cir. 2009). However, there is no necessary written communication when a participant in an oral conversation merely prepares personal notes of the conversation. Countryside Limited Partnership v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. 347 (2009).

The privilege may be waived by any disclosure of the privileged information to a third party not sharing a common legal interest with the client or not necessary to the tax practitioner-client consultation.

Federally authorized tax practitioner means any individual who is authorized under federal law to practice before the IRS. See Circular 230. The term includes attorneys, certified public accountants, enrolled agents, and enrolled actuaries. The term tax advice means advice given by an individual with respect to matters within the scope of that individual’s authority to practice before the IRS. IRC 7525(a)(3).

The privilege may only be asserted in:

The privilege may not be asserted to prevent the disclosure of information to any regulatory body other than the IRS, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), including in an administrative or a court proceeding.

In general, there is no federally recognized privilege as to communications between a taxpayer and a physician. United States v. Moore, 970 F.2d 48, 50 (5th Cir. 1992).

The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, (Pub. L. 104-191, enacted August 21, 1996), now provides privacy rights for individuals whose health care records are maintained by "covered entities." When seeking documents from health care providers, consult with Area Counsel.

The authority of the IRS to issue and enforce summonses is governed by IRC 7602, which gives the IRS broad powers to summon any information that may be relevant to the investigation of a person's tax liability. IRS summons powers should not be limited except by clearly expressed Congressional intent or clearly recognized privileges and immunities. In United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 816 (1984), the Supreme Court, citing United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141 (1975), stated that except for traditional privileges and limitations, "other restrictions upon the [IRS’s] summons power should be avoided absent unambiguous directions from Congress."

Although courts have been reluctant to circumscribe IRS summons power as granted to it by Congress, privacy rights have developed in the form of a patchwork of industry and sector-specific statutes that can be found in statutes other than the Code. When Congress has intended to exclude the IRS from general restrictions placed on government investigatory powers contained in statutes other than the Code, it has done so explicitly. For example, Congress provided an exception for the IRS from the strictures contained in the Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 USC 3401 et seq., so long as the IRS followed Code procedures. See 12 USC 3413; Neece v. United States, 922 F.2d 573 (10th Cir. 1990).

Certain federal privacy statutes were designed to protect the right to privacy from private and government sector infringement by imposing limitations on IRS summons authority. These limitations must be complied with before a party may disclose information to the IRS pursuant to a summons. Examples of these statutes include the following:

With respect to the SCA, the IRS has adopted a policy that it will obtain a search warrant (not use a summons) in all cases when it seeks from an internet service provider (ISP) the content of email communications stored by the ISP. Accordingly, the IRS will not seek the content of email communications from an ISP in any civil administrative proceeding. See IRM 1.2.1.5.37, Policy Statement 4-120 (May 3, 2013), Policy Regarding Requests for the Content of Email Communications under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act and Stored Communications .

When these statutes or others emerge in your cases, contact Area Counsel for advice as to their impact.

A witness appearing in response to an administrative summons will frequently claim other rights. Two frequently encountered are the rights to be represented by counsel and to make an audio recording of the summoned interview.

IRC 7610(a)(1) provides that persons who are summoned are entitled to receive witness fees and travel expenses. Such persons may be taxpayers or third parties, and they may obtain payment upon request. It should be noted that the conditions under which a summoned person may obtain payment for witness fees and travel expenses are separate and distinct from those under which payment for other costs associated with summons compliance may be authorized.

IRC 7610(a)(2) provides that the IRS will pay certain third parties for the direct costs incurred in locating, reproducing or transporting records in compliance with a summons.

The costs for which such third parties may claim payment are in addition to, and not a substitute for, witness fees and travel expenses.

Refer to 26 CFR 301.7610-1(c)(2) for specific payment rates for search, reproduction, and transportation costs.

See IRM 25.5.9, Fees and Costs for Summoned Witnesses, for more information.

In general, neither the witness, nor a third party, including the taxpayer, is entitled to declaratory or injunctive relief through a suit brought to quash a summons. Such persons have an adequate remedy at law by a challenge to the summons before the examining agent and before the district court at the summons enforcement proceeding. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440 (1964).

IRC 7210 makes it a crime for a person to refuse or fail to testify or appear when summoned. That section provides for a fine of not more than a thousand dollars, or imprisonment for not more than one year, or both, together with costs of prosecution, upon conviction.

The possibility of criminal prosecution under this section is, of course, a powerful tool at the disposal of the IRS to compel compliance with the administrative summons. However, a conviction under IRC 7210 does not accomplish the primary purpose of the summons, namely, obtaining the needed information, because any proceedings to enforce the summons would be held in abeyance pending the outcome of the criminal proceedings.

Criminal proceedings may be effective when, for example, the person summoned falsely claims the documents have been destroyed.

See IRM 25.5.10, Enforcement of Summons, for more information.

The judicial device for enforcing the administrative summons is provided by IRC 7402(b) and IRC 7604. These sections provide a means of requiring the person summoned to comply.

IRC 7402(b) and IRC 7604(a) provide that jurisdiction to compel summons compliance is in the United States district court for the district in which the summoned person resides or is found. The effect of a proceeding under IRC 7604 is to obtain the assistance of the court in forcing the summoned person to give the desired information to the IRS by having the court issue an order to that effect. Disobedience of such an order would be a civil contempt punishable by the court.

Disobeying a court’s summons enforcement order can be addressed by both civil and criminal contempt proceedings.

See IRM 25.5.10, Enforcement of Summons, for more information.

The automatic stay provisions of 11 USC 362(a)(6) prohibit "any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title."

The Office of Chief Counsel has determined that service of a collection summons is an "act to collect" and should not be issued while the automatic stay is in effect. IRM 5.17.8.10(2), Automatic Stay - 11 USC 362.

Summonses issued as part of DEL RET, or any other investigation where the liability at issue has not been assessed or determined through a court judgment, are not considered collection summonses. Accordingly, these summonses would not violate the automatic stay provision of 11 USC 362(a).

The automatic stay provisions of 11 USC 362(a) do not bar the issuance of exam purpose summonses, such as to determine a debtor’s or a debtor officer’s liability for the TFRP.

Indian Tribal Governments shall be treated as states for certain purposes per IRC 7871. Therefore, a unique relationship exists between Indian tribal governments and the United States government. This relationship requires a heightened level of sensitivity with respect to compliance efforts.

Do not serve a summons on a tribal government or a third party for information concerning a tribal government without coordinating with the IRS Indian Tribal Government (ITG) office in TE/GE. This coordination includes any summons issued by the IRS, including those summonses issued to investigate the TFRP for the responsible persons of a tribal entity. A summons initiated by Criminal Investigation is excepted from this requirement. See IRM 25.5.6.6.7.2, Indian Tribal Government, for additional information.